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Abstract
In this note we take a …rst step towards the analysis of collusion in
markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location
choices. We …nd that collusion can only be pro…table if a coalition
contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location
games played in k–dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers
are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on
the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive su¢cient
conditions for collusion to be pro…table.
1 Introduction
While economic literature has paid considerable attention to collusion in
Bertrand and Cournot markets, collusion with di¤erent sorts of competition
has been largely neglected. In this note we take a …rst step towards the
analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case
of pure location choices as introduced by Hotelling (1929). Our results are
based on an approach which does not rely on any rationality requirements.
It assumes that players discussing the formation of a coalition will only
go ahead if they can guarantee themselves a payo¤ better than the payo¤
expected “behind the veil of ignorance”. For linear and circular cities with
a uniform distribution of consumers we …nd that collusion is pro…table if
and only if more than half of the players collude. Part of this result can
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be generalized to location games in multi–dimensional spaces with arbitrary
density functions: As long as the distribution of consumers is atomless,
collusion can only be pro…table if more than half of all …rms cooperate. For
competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we are also able
to derive su¢cient conditions for collusion to be pro…table. These results
are of considerable relevance for the topic of merger in markets with limited
price competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the general setup and notation. Section 3 deals with the simplest
one–dimensional cases, i.e., with linear and circular cities with uniform con-
sumer densities. Section 4 deals with the general multi–dimensional case
and establishes the main theorem of the paper. Section 5 adds su¢cient
conditions for collusion to be pro…table in games on the unit line, unit circle
and unit square. Section 6 concludes.
2 Setup and de…nitions
Let ¡(O;P ) be a location game on O µ Rk with set of players P . Let
pi 2 P be player i with i = 1; 2; :::; n. Each player pi chooses a location
xi 2 O. Consumers are distributed over O via a Lebesgue measurable
density function f with total mass 1. Let d(o; o0) be the distance between
two points o; o0 2 O. Each consumer is assumed to buy one unit of an
unspeci…ed good from the player closest to her. That is, a consumer at
o 2 O buys from player i only if d(o; xi) = minj d(o; xj). If there are more
than one closest player then the consumer is assumed to buy from each
closest player with the same probability. The price of the good is …xed at 1
and production costs are normalized to zero.
Let Oi(¡) =
©
o j d(o; xi) = minj d(o; xj)
ª
. Player pi’s market share and
pro…t is then given by ¼i(¡) = 1ri
R
Oi f(o)do where r
i denotes the number
of players located at xi. By assumption,
P
i ¼
i = 1. By virtue of this fact,
we say that a player’s expected payo¤ before the game is actually played
(“behind the veil of ignorance”) is 1n .
Next we de…ne for integer m with 1 · m < n a set V (m) of reals with
v 2 V (m) if there is a collusion strategy for a coalition M µ P of m players
that guarantees them a total payo¤ of at least v. Let v(m) = supV (m).
De…nition 1 Collusion of a set of m players is pro…table if v(m) > mn .
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3 The one–dimensional case with uniform distri-
butions
3.1 Linear cities
Let us …rst consider the standard textbook case of a “linear city” in which
O = [0; 1] and in which consumers are uniformly distributed. How can
a coalition of m players guarantee itself a “high” payo¤? Suppose m >
n ¡ m, i.e., suppose that more than half of all …rms are in the coalition. In
that case the coalition can minimize the payo¤ obtainable to a …rm outside
the coalition by “evenly spreading out.” If f is uniform, the …rms in the
coalition can guarantee themselves a payo¤ of 3m¡n2m by locating themselves
at (k; 3k; 5k; :::; 1 ¡ k) with k = 12m . To see this, note that in this case
a …rm outside the coalition is indi¤erent between all possible locations as
each location yields a payo¤ of 12m . Furthermore, the worst thing that can
happen to the coalition is that the …rms outside locate in di¤erent intervals,
say, one between k and 3k, one between 3k and 5k and so on. If they do, the
coalition earns 1 ¡ n¡m2m = 3m¡n2m . And as this is larger than mn for m > n2
collusion turns out to be pro…table. Thus m > n2 is su¢cient for collusion to
be pro…table in linear cities with a uniform distribution of consumers. That
it is also necessary in this case is stated in
Proposition 1 In linear cities with a uniform distribution of consumers
collusion pays if and only if m > n2 .
Proof The argument above shows that m > n2 ) v(m) > mn . Next observe
that, by de…nition,
v(m) + v(n ¡ m) · 1. (1)
Hence, m = n2 ) m = n ¡ m ) v(m) · 12 = mn , i.e., collusion
is not pro…table if exactly half of all …rms cooperate. The proof is
completed by showing that collusion is also not pro…table if m < n2 : If
1 · m < n2 , then n2 < n ¡ m · n ¡ 1 so that by the …rst part of the
proof v(n ¡ m) > n¡mn . Therefore, by (1) v(m) < 1 ¡ n¡mn = mn .¤
3.2 Circular cities
A further popular space to study location games on is a circle. In contrast
to the line a set of m colluding …rms can divide a circle into at most m arcs
as opposed to m + 1 segments on the line. Nevertheless, one obtains the
identical condition for collusion to be pro…table.
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Proposition 2 In circular cities with a uniform distribution of consumers
collusion pays if and only if m > n2 .
Proof Position the colluding …rms such that there are m arcs with mass
1
m each. If m ¸ n2 the maximum total payo¤ the non–colluding …rms
can obtain is n¡m2m , i.e., by using this strategy the colluding …rms can
ensure a payo¤ of 3m¡n2m which is greater than
m
n if m >
n
2 . Using (1)
again completes the proof.¤
4 The multi–dimensional case
The following result is the main result of the paper. It generalizes one of the
two insights gained above, namely that collusion in location games can only
be pro…table if more than half of all …rms cooperate. This result holds for
arbitrary bounded open subsets of Rk and for arbitrary bounded atomless
density functions.
Theorem 1 Suppose consumers are distributed over a bounded open subset
O µ Rk via a bounded Lebesgue measurable density function f of total mass
1. For the n–player location game ¡(O; P ) it is not pro…table for an m–
player coalition to collude if m · n2 .
Proof Suppose the m colluding players p1; p2; :::; pm locate at x1; x2; :::; xm 2
O, not necessarily distinct.
Case 1. n ¡ m ¸ 2m. Then for each i, 1 · i · m, let pm+2i¡1
and pm+2i locate at xm+2i¡1 and xm+2i, two points " units apart on
a line through xi, with xi between xm+2i¡1 and xm+2i and " chosen
as follows: Let B be a k–dimensional ball containing O and let A be
the k ¡ 1–dimensional volume of the k ¡ 1–dimensional disk formed
by intersecting B with a hyperplane through its center. Choose "
such that " < 1nA sup f and such that " is small enough to guaran-
tee x2m+i¡1; x2m+i 2 O for 1 · i · m. Let the rest of the non–
colluding players, p3m+1; p3m+2; :::; pn locate anywhere in O. Since the
consumers won by pi, 1 · i · m, lie between two hyperplanes " units
apart, ¼i is at most "A sup f < 1n . Hence, v(m) <
m
n .
Case 2. m < n ¡ m < 2m. For 1 · i · m, de…ne the provisional
market set Oiprov = Oi(¡0) with ¡0 = ¡(O;M), i.e., Oiprov contains
the points in O that are nearer to xi than to any other xj 6= xi with
both i; j · m. Accordingly, de…ne the provisional payo¤ ¼iprov =
4
¼i(¡0). W.l.o.g. assume that the sequence ¼1prov; ¼2prov; :::; ¼mprov is
non–decreasing. Now locate 3m ¡ n of the non–colluding players at
x1; x2; :::; x3m¡n and use the remaining 2n ¡ 4m players to bracket
x3m¡n+1; x3m¡n+2; :::; xm as in case 1, but do net yet choose ". No-
tice that (i) 3m ¡ n > 0; (ii) 2n ¡ 4m > 0; (iii) (3m ¡ n) + (2n ¡
4m) = n ¡ m; and (iv) (3m ¡ n) + (2n ¡ 4m)=2 = m. Since the
sequence ¼1prov; ¼2prov; :::; ¼mprov is non–decreasing, the sum of the pro-
visional payo¤s ¼1prov + ¼2prov + ::: + ¼3m¡nprov is at most
3m¡n
m . There-
fore, the …nal total payo¤s to the colluding players
Pm
i=1 ¼
i is at most
3m¡n
2m + "(n ¡ 2m)A sup f . Now notice that 3m¡n2m < mn . Hence, it
is possible to choose " such that mn ¡
Pm
i=1 ¼
i > 0. Collusion is not
pro…table.
Case 3. m = n ¡ m. Nonpro…tability follows from (1) as in the proof
of Proposition 1.¤
Thus, we know that collusion in location games (on bounded open sub-
sets of Rk in which consumers are distributed via atomless density functions)
can only be pro…table if more than half of all …rms join a coalition.
Remark 1 Note that neither the closed interval [0; 1] nor a circle is an open
subset of a Euclidean space. However, the conclusion of the theorem
holds for location games on these sets, since the techniques of the proof
apply. More particularly, it is possible to bracket colluding players as
in the proofs. In fact, a colluding player at 0 or 1 in [0; 1] can be
bracketed by a single non–colluding player.
Remark 2 The theorem concerns location games de…ned using Euclidean
distances, i.e., straight line distances. Implicitly, this means that con-
sumers may travel along routes that do not belong to O. However,
the theorem applies, for example, to a circle (or rather the conclusion
of the theorem holds—see Remark 1) even when the distance between
two points is the length of the arc joining them, since for a circle in R2
a consumer’s nearest player is the same whether distance is de…ned as
Euclidean distance or as arc length.
The theorem disallows atoms of consumers. The following example
demonstrates the necessity of this assumption.
Example Consider the 5–player location game on [0; 1] with two consumers,
one at 14 and one at
2
3 . Suppose p
1 and p2 collude by locating at 14
5
and 23 respectively. Their worst total payo¤ occurs when p
3 and p4
locate at 14 and p
5 locates at 23 . The total payo¤ of p






6 which is greater than the veil of ignorance expected payo¤ of
2(25) =
4
5 . Collusion is pro…table with m = 2 even though m <
n
2 . As
in the proof of Proposition 1, where it is shown that the complement
of a pro…table coalition is unpro…table, collusion is unpro…table for
m = 3, even though in that case m > n2 .¤
5 Su¢cient conditions for unit interval, unit cir-
cle, and unit square
The main theorem above showed that m > n2 is necessary for collusion to
be successful. In the following we will establish su¢cient conditions for
collusion to be pro…table in a location game played on the unit interval, the
unit circle, and the unit square.





Proof W.l.o.g. let x1 · x2 · ::: · xm be the set of locations occupied by




















If a non–colluding player locates to the left of x1 or to the right of
xm, his payo¤ is at most 12m <
1
n . If a non–colluding player locates
between xi and xi+1, his payo¤ is
R d
c f(o)do where x
i < c < d < xi+1
and d ¡ c = 12(xi+1 ¡ xi). Then
Z d
c






























If a non–colluding player locates at xi, 1 · i · m, then he shares the
market set Oi with pi. By the argument above, the portion of Oi to
the left of xi has consumer mass less than 1n , as does the portion of O
i
to the right of xi. Therefore, the payo¤ to each non–colluding player




n . Since in all these cases the payo¤ to a
non–colluding player is less than 1n ; the total payo¤ to the coalition is
more than 1 ¡ n¡mn = mn . Collusion is pro…table.¤
The su¢cient condition in Proposition 3 is stronger than necessary. For





This allows any amount of variation to the left of x1 and to the right of xm
and, if m is large, between x1 and xm.1





Proof Analogous to the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3.¤
Finally, we look at location games played on the unit square with uniform
consumer density.
Proposition 5 For the n–player location game on the square [0; 1] £ [0; 1]
with consumers distributed uniformly, collusion is pro…table if there is a
positive integer h with (2h + 1)2 ¡ h2 · m < n < (2h + 1)2.
Proof Suppose m; n and h satisfy the hypotheses of the theorem. Consider
the set C of points in [0; 1]£[0; 1] of the form ( i¡1=22h+1 ;
j¡1=2
2h+1 ) where i and
j are integers, 1 · i; j · 2h+ 1, and i and j are not both even. There
are exactly (2h+1)2 ¡h2 points in C. Locate the m colluding players
so that there is at least one of them at each point of C (recall that
m ¸ (2h + 1)2 ¡ h2). In the course of proving that an in…nite square
lattice is a Nash equilibrium for the location game in the plane with
consumers distributed uniformly, Knoblauch (1998) proved that in the
1Moreover, the …rms located at x1 and xm could move further into the interior as
the mass on the fringes has only to be smaller than 1n . Using this, one can increase the





> 2mn . To see this, simply
observe that the colluding players can position themselves so that the remaining mass















location game on [0; 1] £ [0; 1], any player with at least one opponent
at each point of C earns a payo¤ a payo¤ of at most 1(2h+1)2 so that the
non–colluding players’ total payo¤ is at most n¡m(2h+1)2 <
n¡m
n . Hence,
v(m) > mn .¤
For large n, the theorem says, roughly, that collusion is pro…table if
m > 3n4 . This interpretation follows from the fact that for large n there is
an integer h such that n < (2h + 1)2, (2h+1)
2
n ¼ 1, and
(2h+1)2¡h2
n ¼ 34 . For
example, if n = 1; 000; 000 choose h = 500. Then (2h + 1)2 = 1; 002; 001




We …nd that collusion in location games only pays if the set of colluders
is larger than the set of non–colluding competitors. Bilateral collusion, for
example, can only pay if there are no more than three competitors. This
result is based on an approach which does not rely on any rationality re-
quirements. It assumes that players discussing the formation of a coalition
will only go ahead if they can guarantee themselves a payo¤ better than the
payo¤ expected “behind the veil of ignorance”.
The results may have implications for the topic of mergers in markets
with (pure) spatial competition as an example of which competition among
big book retailers (where price competition is extremely limited) may serve.
As merger in the traditional sense (see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds 1983)
where …rms simply “disappear” never pays in such location games, merger
can only be pro…table if the merging units are kept as separate units which
are governed by a central headquarter. This is identical to the case of
collusion analysed above. However, the analysis reveals that with this kind
of competition only “mega mergers” are likely to occur.2
2Concerning the market for books such a mega merger has recently occurred in the UK
where Waterstone’s took over Dillon’s. And, interestingly, the new Waterstone’s branches
in London are pretty much “spread out.” In particular, Waterstone’s two ‡agship stores
are not at Charing Cross Road, the traditional spot for large book stores but rather “to
the left and to the right” of the competitors’ big stores, namely at Picadilly and UCL.
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